Carole Pearce's argument against African philosophy is founded on a set of factual flaws and the fallacious assumption that African philosophy is equivalent to ethnophilosophy, which she defines as a form of intellectual apartheid founded on irrational belief systems. I argue that African philosophy is in no way qualitatively different from, say, French or Chinese philosophy, and that ethnophilosophy is merely one aspect of it But ethnophilosophy could play the important role of critically evaluating African ethnic belief systems and the (...) interpretation of such by Western anthropologists. In general, African philoso phy is nothing more than the philosophical research (of whatever order) carried out by African philosophers in the context of African research paradigms. (shrink)

The manuscript tradition of Seneca'sDialoguesconsists of one eleventhcentury manuscript, Ambrosianus C 90 inf., which is the main source for the text, and a ruck of later manuscripts of lesser and disputed worth. There are over a hundred of these, far more than has been supposed.

Context: A tension exists between the needs and desires of the institutions providing the funding for academics to attend conferences and the potential for transforming the knowledge and understanding of conference participants - than in advancing their own careers and celebrity. Approaches to the problem can recognize the importance of funding and career-building in the current society, while still experimenting in ways that could generate new ideas. Method: Ideas from second-order cybernetics are used to derive design principles that might alleviate (...) the tension and encourage deep conversations, idea generation and experimentation. The author draws on experiences with designing, organizing and participating in cybernetics conferences over a period of 34 years. Results: An academic conference designed to a set of broad, second-order cybernetic principles, where participants are informed of the design intent before they decide to attend, can open an opportunity for learning, understanding and the creation of new ideas in ways that would not otherwise be available. Although there are no guarantees, such designs can attenuate the tension, often experienced at traditionally designed conferences, between advancing individual careers/celebrity and building new knowledge together. Implications: The design principles derived, already exhibited in some conferences, could be useful to organizers wishing to foster incompatible and opposing ideas and facilitate dialogue among conference participants. These same principles have implications for the design of other social systems and point to the possibility of a new and more humane society. Constructivist content: A feature of second-order cybernetics is that knowledge is continually changing as our desires change, and we must take responsibility for the consequences of the ideas we construct and use to satisfy our desires. Key Words: Design by constraint, dynamics of interaction, asynchronicity, tyranny of the clock, times of truth, moments of art. (shrink)

In their paper, “Helpful Lessons and Cautionary Tales: How Should COVID-19 Drug Development and Access Inform Approaches to Non-Pandemic Diseases?” Holly Fernandez Lynch and colleagues have present...

Provability logics with many modal operators for progressions of theories obtained by iterating their consistency statements are introduced. The corresponding arithmetical completeness theorem is proved.

Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic’s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring (...) with them a commitment to act in accordance with those judgments. Instead, I propose an alternative account of our normative concepts according to which only ought simpliciter judgments commit one to acting in accordance with those judgments. In addition to answering the sceptical challenge, the proposal offers an independently motivated account of what makes a concept normatively authoritative. (shrink)

Metaethical expressivism is typically characterised as the view that normative statements express desire-like attitudes instead of beliefs. However, in this paper I argue that expressivists should claim that normative statements express beliefs in normative propositions, and not merely in some deflationary sense but in a theoretically robust sense explicated by a theory of propositional attitudes. I first argue that this can be achieved by combining an interpretationist understanding of belief with a nonfactualist view of normative belief content. This results in (...) a view I call ‘interpretative expressivism’. I then argue that traditional arguments employed by expressivists that normative statements express noncognitive attitudes can just as well support the claim that normative statements express nonfactual or nonrepresentational beliefs. Finally, I argue that this view has a number of advantages to versions of expressivism that deny that normative statements express non-deflationary normative beliefs. (shrink)

L. D. Harris; IV*—Solving the “Naval Battle”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 45–62, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

This paper examines the general prospects for conceptual role expressivism, expressivist theories that embrace conceptual role semantics. It has two main aims. The first aim is to provide a general characterisation of the view. The second aim is to raise a challenge for the general view. The challenge is to explain why normative concepts are not a species of defective concepts, where defective concepts are those that cannot meaningfully embed and participate in genuine inference. After rejecting existing attempts to answer (...) the challenge, I propose an alternative solution. However, the solution leaves conceptual role expressivism a far less distinctive and interesting position than its proponents claim. I conclude that we should be sceptical about how much expressivists gain by appealing to conceptual role semantics. (shrink)

The target article “Thinking Through Other Minds” (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was bothsynthetic– building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; andprescriptive– showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and (...) cultural ecologies of mind. In this reply to commentators, we address key issues, including: (1) refining the concept of culture to show how TTOM and the free-energy principle (FEP) can capture essential elements of human adaptation and functioning; (2) addressing cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances; (3) clarifying the significance of the FEP formalism related to entropy minimization, Bayesian inference, Markov blankets, and enactivist views; (4) developing empirical tests and applications of the TTOM model; (5) incorporating cultural diversity and context at the level of intra-cultural variation, individual differences, and the transition to digital niches; and (6) considering some implications for psychiatry. The commentators’ critiques and suggestions point to useful refinements and applications of the model. In ongoing collaborations, we are exploring how to augment the theory with affective valence, take into account individual differences and historicity, and apply the model to specific domains including epistemic bias. (shrink)

A general equation is derived describing the concentration of all possible complexes of a central molecule with a set of ligands bound to the central molecule. This deduction allows the reaction rate constants for the binding of a given molecule to the central molecule to depend on the species of molecules already bound and the location of the molecules already bound. The model thus allows for structural alteration of the central molecule by binding. Functions describing the concentration dependence of any (...) effect whatever depending on the distribution of complexes are deduced. Possible applications and methods of application are indicated.II est dérivé une équation qui décrit la concentration des toutes les complexes d'une molécule centrale avec une collection de ligands connectés à la molécule centrale. La déduction montre comme les coefficients de la rapidité de reaction entre la molécule centrale et les molécules de la collection dépend de l'espèce et de la location des molécules déjà connectées.La modèle dérivée de l'équation montre les changements structurelles par la connection. Les functions qui décrivent la dependence de chaque effet à la concentration, sont dérivés. Ces effects dépendent aussi à la distribution des complexes. Des applications et des méthodes sont indiqués.Eine allgemeine Vergleichung hat man bekommen welche die Konzentration aller möglichen Komplexen eines zentralen Moleküles mit einer Reihe von „Ligands” verbunden mit dem zentralen Molekül beschreibt. Diese Folgerung gestattet dass die Reaktiongeschwindigkeit Konstanten für die Bindung eines gegebenen Moleküles mit dem zentralen Molekül abhÄngt von den Arten schon gegebenen Molekülen und die Ortsbestimmung der schon gebundenen Molekülen. Das Model zeigt die strukturelle Änderungen des zentralen Moleküls durch Bindung. Funktionen, die die Konzentrationband jedes Effektes beschreiben dass abhÄngt von der Distribution der Komplexen, sind abgeleitet.Mögliche Anwendungen und Methoden von Anwendung sind dargelegt. (shrink)

L. D. Harris; IV*—Solving the “Naval Battle”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 45–62, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

Expressivists about normative thought and discourse traditionally deny that there are nondeflationary normative propositions. However, it has recently been suggested that expressivists might avoid a number of problems by providing a theory of normative propositions compatible with expressivism. This paper explores the prospects for developing an expressivist theory of propositions within the framework of cognitive act theories of propositions. First, I argue that the only extant expressivist theory of cognitive propositions—Michael Ridge's ‘ecumenical expressivist’ theory—fails to explain identity conditions for normative (...) propositions. Second, I argue that this failure motivates a general constraint—the ‘unity requirement’—that any expressivist theory of propositions must provide a unified nonrepresentational explanation of that in virtue of which propositional attitudes have the content that they have. Third, I argue that conceptual role accounts of content provide a promising framework in which to develop an expressivist theory of cognitive propositions. (shrink)

This work examines the claim to scienific status made by supporters and practitioners of neoclassical economics. The approach taken is that of the history and philosophy of science. Analysis points to the conclusion that theories of economic choice are necessarily normative, essentially because of the nature of human behavior.

Much of the mathematics with which Felix Klein and Sophus Lie are now associated (Klein’s Erlangen Program and Lie’s theory of transformation groups) is rooted in ideas they developed in their early work: the consideration of geometric objects or properties preserved by systems of transformations. As early as 1870, Lie studied particular examples of what he later called contact transformations, which preserve tangency and which came to play a crucial role in his systematic study of transformation groups and differential equations. (...) This note examines Klein’s efforts in the 1870s to interpret contact transformations in terms of connexes and traces that interpretation (which included a false assumption) over the decades that follow. The analysis passes from Klein’s letters to Lie through Lindemann’s edition of Clebsch’s lectures on geometry in 1876, Lie’s criticism of it in his treatise on transformation groups in 1893, and the careful development of that interpretation by Dohmen, a student of Engel, in his 1905 dissertation. The now-obscure notion of connexes and its relation to Lie’s line elements and surface elements are discussed here in some detail. (shrink)

The shape of a life hypothesis holds that the temporal sequence of good or bad times in a life can itself be a valuable feature of that life. This is generally thought to be incompatible with additivism about lifetime well-being, which holds that lifetime well-being is fully determined by momentary well-being. This discussion examines Dale Dorsey’s recent argument that these views are in fact compatible. I argue that accepting the conjunction of these views requires stronger commitments than Dorsey recognizes. After (...) arguing that these commitments are problematic, I conclude that we should reject the compatibility claim. (shrink)

The manuscript tradition of Seneca's Dialogues consists of one eleventhcentury manuscript, Ambrosianus C 90 inf. , which is the main source for the text, and a ruck of later manuscripts of lesser and disputed worth. There are over a hundred of these, far more than has been supposed.